Michigan Law Review
Volume 45

Issue 6

1947

CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF FEDERAL ANTI-POLL TAX
LEGISLATION
Joseph E. Kallenbach
University of Michigan

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Election Law Commons, Law and Race
Commons, and the Taxation-State and Local Commons

Recommended Citation
Joseph E. Kallenbach, CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF FEDERAL ANTI-POLL TAX LEGISLATION, 45 MICH.
L. REV. 716 (1947).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol45/iss6/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

1 947}

ANTI-POLL TAX LEGISLATION

CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF FEDERAL ANTI-POLL
TAX LEGISLATION

Joseph E. Kallenbach*

T

HE proposal to abolish by national law the requirement now prevailing in seven Southern states 1 that voters shall have paid a poll
tax in order to vote in any national election involves a constitutional
issue of the :first magnitude. In the decade immediately following the
Civil War the constitutional division of authority between the national
and state governments in dealing with the question of Negro suffrage
became a point of bitter controversy in Congress. Out of this struggle
came the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution,
with certain supporting legislation,2 the aim of whfcp_ was to prohibit
disfranchisement of the Negro on grounds of race, color, or previous
.condition of servitude. The current anti-poll tax proposal is designed
to carry forward one step further the limitations on state power embodied in these amendments insofar as national elections are concerned,
and to realize in a more complete sense their basic objective.
Agitation for the enactment of a Congressional statute of this nature began in r938. Shortly after the general election of that year the
Southern Conference on Human Welfare, an association of Southern
intellectual and social reform leaders, adopted a resolution urging both
state and federal action to abolish poll tax payment as a suffrage requirement.8 A bill designed to accomplish this result was introduced in
Congress the next year by Representative Lee S. Geyer, Democrat, of

* Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan.

.
Alabama: Ala. Const. (1901), art. VIII, § 178, as amended by Amendji,ent X
(1923), Amendment XIV (1924), Amendment XLIX (1944); Ala. Code Ann.
(1940) tit. 17, § 12 and Ala. Gen. Acts (1945) No. 161, § IO. Arkansas: Ark. Co115t.
(1874), art. III, § 1, as amended by Amendment No. 8 (1920), Amendment No. 36
(1944); Ark. Dig. Stat. (Pope, 1937) §§ 4695, 4745. Mississippi: Miss. Const.
(1890), art. 12, § 241; Miss. Code (1942) §§ 3130, 3160, 3235; Miss. Gen. Laws
(1944) c. 171, § 5. South Carolina: S.C. Const. (1895), art. II, § 4 (e), as amended
1931; S.C. Code (1942) c. 100, § 2267; id. (Supp. 1944) § 2971; S.C.Acts (1944)
No. 406. Tennessee: Tenn. Const. (1870), art. IV,.§ l; Tenn. Code Ann. (Williams, 1934) §§ 2027, 2028; id. (1945 Supp.)§ 2043.1. Texas:Tex. Const. (1876),
art. 6, § 2, as amended by art. 6, § 2A (1945); Tex. Stat. Ann (Vernon, 1925) c. 5,
arts. 2955, 2959, 2960; id. (1946 Supp.), arts. 2959-2970. Virginia: Va. Const.
(1902), art. II, § 18-22; Va. Code Ann. (1942) tit. 6, c. IO, §§ 82, 83, 93, c. II,
§§ lOC)-II6; Va. Acts (Extra Sess., 1945) c. 79.
2
Act of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. L. 140.
8
Cf. 84 CoNG. REc., Appx. 4123-4125 (1939).
1
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California.4 Although hearings were held upon it, this original antipoll tax measure died in the House Judiciary Committee.
The Geyer Bill was reintroduced in the next Congress. It was
eventually passed by the House on October 13, -1942, by a vote of
254 to 84.5 ·A substitute version, sponsored by Senator Claude Pepper,
Democrat, of Florida, was reported out by the Senate Judiciary Committee.6 It failed of passage in the Senate several weeks later, when a
filibuster was organized against it by certain Southern Senators and an
attempt to apply the cloture rule to debate proved unsuccessful. 7 The
pattern thus set by the two Houses in the 77th Congress was repeated
in the two succeeding Congresses. The Marcantonio Bill, a measure
identical in form with Senator Pepper's substitute for the Geyer Bill of
the previous Congress, was passed by the House in 1943.8 It was killed
by Senate filibuster early in 1944.9 Similar results followed the passage of the Pepper-Marcantonio Bill in the House during the 79th
Congress.10
•
Meanwhile the poU tax issue had arisen in connection with the
passage of the Ramsey Act of 1942, which was designed to facilitate
participation in the Congressional elections of that year by members of
the armed forces. During passage of this measure through the Senate
an amendment to it abolishing the requirement of payment of poll
taxes for voters in the armed services was inserted. The anti-poll tax
clause was subsequently incorporated in the final draft, after conference
committee action.11 The poll tax exemption clause of the Ramsey Act 12
4

The bill, which he introduced "by request," was actually drafted by the Committee on Civil Rights of the Southern Conference on Human Wefare.
5
88 CoNG. REc. 8066-8081, 8120-8175 (1942). Recourse to the discharge
procedure again\t the House Rules and Judiciary Committees wa~ necessary to permit its
considil"ation.
·
_
6
1'. Rep. l 662, 79th Cong., 2d sess.
7
88 CoNG. REc. 8814 passim, 9065-9072 (1942). The motion to invoke cloture
was defeated by a vote of 37 to 41, a two-thirds majority being required.
8
89 'CoNG. REc. 4807 passim, 4889 (1943). Representative Marcantonio,
American Labor Party Member, of New York, became the sponsor of the bill in the
House following the death of Representative Geyer in 1941.
9
90 CONG. REc. 4172 passim, 4470 (1944).
10
91 CoNG. REc. 5291 pasim, 6003 (1945); 92 CoNG. REc. 10383 passim,
10536-7 (1946).
11
The poll tax exemption amendment, which was offered by Senator Brooks,
Republican, of Illinois, was included in the bill after efforts by Represen,tative Kefauver,
Democrat, of Tennessee, to insert a similar provision had failed on original considera..:
tion of the bill in 'the House. Cf. 88 CoNG. REc. 6544-6569, 6900-6941, 6952-6972,
7079 (1942).
12
Act of Sept. 16, 1942, 56 Stat. L. 753, c. '561, § 2.
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proved to be of little consequence in the I 942 Congressional elections;
however, because of the light participation by armed forces personnel
in the balloting. When the Servicemen's Ballot Act was passed in I 944,
amending the Ramsey Act in various respects, the poll tax exemption
clause of the earlier statute was retained.18 Its effect was therefore felt
in greater degree in the general election of I 944, since a much larger
number of participating voters were affected. Those states which had
not already adjusted their voting requirements to conform to the
exemption clause in the earlier federal statute eventually did so by enactment of appropriate legislation ood the adoption of constitutional
amendments where necessary.14 The constitutionality of the exemption
clause of the federal statute was not necessarily conceded in these state
actions. Nevertheless the federal law must have contributed in some
m~asure to the limited retreat from the poll tax system thus made.
Adjustment of state laws and constitutional provisions to conform to
the federal statute averted a collision of national and state authority,
and no judicial examination of the constitutional issue resulted. Meanwhile the more comprehensive Pepper-Marcantonio Bill remains before Congress, presenting in direct fashion the basic constitutional
issue. What effect seizure of control over both Houses of Congress by
the Republicans in the I 946 elections will have on the vigor with which
the struggle for passage of an anti-poll tax law is waged is somewhat
conjectural.15 In any event it is unlikely that we have seen the end oP.
50 U.S.C. (Supp. 1941-1946) § 302. The clause stipulates: "No person in
military service in time of war shall be required, as a condition of voting in any election for President, Vice President, electors for President or Vice President, or for
Senator or Member of the House of Representatives, to pay any poll tax or make any
other payment to any State or political subdivision thereof."
14 Four of the poll tax states were able to exempt members of the armed services
from the poll tax requirement by merely revising their suffrage and revenue laws: Miss.
Gen. Laws (1944) c. 171, § 5; Tenn. Code Ann. (Williams, 1945 Supp.) § 2043.1;
Va. Acts (Extra sess., 1945) c. 79; S.C. Code (1944 Supp.) § 2971 and S.C. Acts
(1944) No. 406, p. 1221. Three states found it necessary first to adopt constitutional
amendments to make effective the exemption: Ala. Const., Amendment XLIX, Nov. 17,
1944, adopted after proposal by the legislature; Ark. Const. (1874), Amendment No.
36, proposed by the initiative and adopied Nov. 7, 1944; Tex. Co·nst. (1876), Amendment to art. 6, § 2, adopted August 25, 1945. The Georgia poll tax requirement was
abolished in toto. Ga. Const. (1945), art. II, § 1, 1f 3 and Ga. Acts and Res. (1944)
No. 43, p. 129. The Tennessee legislature, in Tenn. Acts (1943) chs. 37, 38, pp.
134, 13 5, repealed the statutory levy of' a poll tax in that state; but this action was
held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the State in Biggs v. Beeler, 180
Tenn. 198, 173 S. W. (2d) 144 (1943).
15 A plank in the 1944 Republican Party Platform pledged submission of a federal constitutional amendment abolishing the poll tax requirement in national elections.
This was in keeping with the general "states rights" tone of the party's pledges on a
18
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agitation for exercise of power by Congress along the lines proposed in
that bill, and the question of the constitutionality of such a measure
remains a live and important one.
The original anti-poll tax measure introduced by Representative
Geyer in 1939 differed from the later Pepper-Marcantonio Bill in
several significant respects. The former was framed as an amendment
tb the Hatch Act of 1939. It was based on the theory that Congress,
under its constitutional authority to regqlate the manner in which
members of Congress are chosen, might act to prevent pernicious
, political activities in federal elections growing out of the poll tax system~ Since there was at that time grave doubt concernins- the existence
of federal power to deal with Congressional primaries, the Geyer Bill
proposed to exempt voters from the poll tax requirement only in the
choice of national officers at general elections. The later version, embodied in the Pepper-Marcantonio Bill, is not designed as an amend,.:.
ment to the Hatch Act. It seeks to abolish the poll tax requirement in
primaries as well as in general elections; 16 and it is based upon an
asserted fundamental authority of Congress to protect the right of
qualified citizens to participate freely in any federal election or primary. Like the Geyer Bill, it would not be operative against poll tax
requirements in state and local elections, nor prevent the levying of
poll taxes by states or their subdivisions for revenue purposes, independently of any national suffrage considerations.
The Pepper-Marcantonio Bill 17 begins with a statement of Congressional intent and justification, which is followed by four sections
containing the prohibitive features. The preamble asserts that through
the imposition of poll tax payment requirements by certain governmental jurisdictions, which have "no reason~ble relation to the intelligence,
number of other issues. It was also in line with an effort made by 33 of the 37 Senate
Republicans early in 1944 to induce the Senate Judiciary Committee to report out a
constitutional amendment proposal of this character. In the House votes on the Geyer
Bill and the Pepper-Marcantonio Bill, however, an overwhelming majority of the
Republican members favored passage; and in the Senate votes on resort to cloture procedure, which were in a sense indicative o~ sentiment on statutory abolition of the poll
tax requirement, a majority of Republicans were recorded on the affirmative side.
16
Doubt on the point of existence of federal power to reach primaries had been
resolved by the Supreme Court in favor of federal authority. Cf. United States v.
Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 61 S. Ct. 1031 (1941), and Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649,
64 S. Ct. 757 (1944).
17 It is titled "A bill concerning the qualifications of voters or electors within the
meaning of Section 2, Article I, of the Constitution, making unlawful the requirement
for the payment of a poll tax as a prerequisite to voting in a primary or general election for national officers."
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ability, character, wealth, community consciousness or other qualifications of voters," many citizens are deprived of the right and privilege
of voting for national officers as guaranteed by the Constitution, and the
integrity of the ballot is impaired. Section I then declares that such a
requirement shall not be deemed a qualification of voters or electors in
choosing Senators, Representatives and Presidential electors within the
meaning of the Constitution, and shall be deemed an "interference"
with the manner of holding primaries and elections and a "tax upon
the right or privilege of voting" for such officers. Section 2 declares it
to be "unlawful" for any state, municipality or other governmental
subdivision to prevent any person from exercising the franchise in
selecting such national officers on the ground of his not having paid a
poll tax, and any requirement of this nature is declared to be "invalid
and void." Sections 3 and 4 by similar language make it unlawful for
any state or local governmental officer to "interfere" with the choice
of national officers by requiring payment of a poll tax, even though
acting under cover of governmental auth9rity. No .criminal penalties
are provided in the proposed act for violation of its terms. It is assumed, apparently, that the penalty provisions of the 1870 Enforcement Act, which have played a prominent part in recent federal actions
protecting suffrage rights in the South,18 could be invoked against
individuals to compel its observance.
Undoubtedly the considerations determining the attitudes of members of Congress toward a federal anti-poll tax measure are primarily
political in nature. The debates in Congress, however, have tended
to center attention largely upon the constitutional question of federal
power. Indeed, opponents state their case almost exclusively in terms
of the alleged unconstitutionality of the proposal. With a liberality
which in some quarters at least may be suspect, many of the bitterest
opponents of a federal poll tax exemption law go so far as to concede
that the poll tax requirement is undemocratic, iniquitous and outmoded,
and should be abolished; but they oppose on constitutional grounds the
use of a federal statute for this purpose. 19 Supporters of restrictive
federal legislation must, perforce, devote a major share of their atten18 Act of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. L. 140, 18 U.S.C. (1940) §§ 51 and 52.
Cf. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 61 S. Ct. 1031 (1941); United States V'.
Saylor, 322 U.S. 385, 64 S. Ct. 1101 (1944); United States v: Mosley, 238 U.S. 383,
35 S. Ct. 904 (1915).
19
Cf., for example, remarks of Senator Bilbo, Democrat, of Mississippi, 88 CoNG.
REc. 8833 and 8953 (1942); Senator Andrews, Democrat, of Florida, id. 9053; Representative Cox, Democrat, of Georgia, id. 8069; Representative Pearson, Democrat, of
Tennessee, id. 8130; and Representative Kilday, Democrat, of Texas, id. 8163.
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tion to answering the ar~ent against >the constitutionality of the
statutory approach, while also developing the argument against the
poll tax requirement on grounds of pol~cy. It is fair to conclude that, if
the constitutional basis for such federal legislation were not so doubtful,
the opposition would hesitate to resort to filibustering tactics to prevent
its passage in the face of the strong national public opinion against the
principle of the poll tax requirement.20 The constitutional issue is
therefore a most crucial point in the controversy.
As advanced in Congressional debates the contentions against the
validity of a federal anti-poll tax law can be summarized in the following general propositions:
( r) By virtue of those sections of the Constitution relating to the
election of ~embers of Congress and Presidential electors 21 power to
determine suffrage qualifications in national elections is vested by the
Constitution in the states, subject only to the limitations of the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments prohibiting the establishment of
qualifications based on race, color, previous condition of servitude, or
sex. State authority over determination of suffrage requirements, therefore, may not be usurped or limited directly by Congress.{ 2) To require the payment of a poll t~ as a voting prerequisite is
a reasonable and appropriate exercise of state power over the suffrage.
In every instance when this requirement has been challenged before
the Supreme Court on various constitutional grounds, it has been
.found to be in conformity with the Constitution. Cases directly in point
are Williams v. Mississippi, 22 in which the requirement that all taxes,
including poll taxes, must be .paid by prospective voters .was found not
to be violative, on its face, of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment;
Breedlove v. Suttles, 28 in which the Georgia poll tax requirement (since
repealed), from which persons over sixty years of age,.the blind, and
20
According to an American Institute of Public Opinion poll taken in April, 1941,
63 per cent of the voting public in the nation at large oppose the poll tax requirement,
while only 25 per cent approve, with -12 per cent undecided. 5 PUBLIC OPINION
Q. 470 (1941).
21 Article I, § 2: "The House of Representatives shall be composed of members
chosen every second year by the people of the several states, and the electors in each
state shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of
the State Legislature." (Similar language is found in the Seventeenth Amendment .rela~
tive to popular election of Senators.)
_
Article II, § 2: "Each State shall appoint, in such manner as the legislature
thereof shall direct, a number of electors equal to the whole number of senators and
representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress..•• "
22
170 U.S. 213, 18 S. Ct. 583 (1898).
28
302 U.S. 277, 58 S. Ct. 205 (1937).

.
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women who did not register for voting were exempted, was sustained
against contentions that it violated the equal protection and privileges
and immunities clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Nineteenth Amendment guarantee ·against suffrage discrimination on
grounds of sex; and Pirtle v. Brown, 24 in which Tennessee's poll tax
requirement was upheld against contentions that it violated the equal
protection and privileges and immunities clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment when applied in the choice of a member of Congress.
(3) It follows from the above contentions that direct national
action to eli:rninate the poll tax requirement is possible only through
adoption of a restrictive constitutional amendment similar to the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments. 25
In meeting these a~guments advocates of an anti-poll tax law employ what might be termed tactics of infiltration rather than direct assault. Conceding the general proposition that the Constitution adopts,
for national elections, the voting qualifications set up by the states, they
insist that the authority of the states in fixing suffrage standards is
nevertheless subject in some degree to Congressional control. The
competence of Congress to abolish by statute a state poll tax requirement is supported by a line of argument embracing the following basic
propositions:
( r) The requirement that a voter, otherwise eligible to participate
in a national election, shall have paid a poll tax is not a suffrage "q~alification" in the sense contemplated by the Constitution in those sections
adopting state electoral qualifications for national elections. Such a requirement has no reasonable relation to a person's competence as a
V10ter, and a finding to this effect is within the power of Congress to
make. Supreme Court pronouncements sustaining state poll tax payment requirements in the face of attacks on constitutional grounds are
not in point on the validity of the proposed anti-poll tax statute. These
pronouncements merely establish the proposition that the Court does
not feel impelled to nullify such requirements solely on the basis of
24

(C.C.A. 6th, 1941) 118 F. (2d) 218; cert. den., 314 U.S. 621, 62 S. Ct. 64

(1941).
25 Opponents concede that Congress might, of course, approach the problem indirectly by a statu'te implementing the clause of section 2 of the Fourteenth Amend...
ment, which provides that a state's representation in the House shall be reduced in
the event that it disfranchises any of its male citizens over twenty-one years of age for
any reason other than participation in rebellion or crime. Various practical considerations bar resort to this indirect approach to abolition of the poll tax requirement, one
of the most obvious of which is determination of the actual number barred from voting
by reason of inability to pay a poll tax.

.
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existing constitutional guarantees in the absence of an expression of
Congressional view regarding their propriety.
( 2) The Supreme Court has declared repeatedly that the right of
duly qualified citizens to participate in Congressional elections is a right
derived from the Constitution of the United States and not from the
states.26 It arises from the stipulations in the Constitution that members
of the House and Senate are to be chosen by the "people" of the sever::i,l •
states. The poll tax requirement constitutes a burden upon and an obstruction to the enjoyment of this right of popular participation in the
election of members of Congress. Hence Congress, under its specific
authority to regulate the manner of Congressional elections 21 and
under its implied power to implement the provisions of the Constitution relative to the organization and functioning of the national government, may legislate to prevent undue infringement upon this right.
(3) Poll tax requirements lead to wide-scale corruption in federal
elections. Purchase of votes by payment of the poll taxes of indifferent
electors is a common practice wherever the poll tax system is found.
Under its power to regulate the manner of Congressional elections and
its power to effectuate provisions of the Constitution generally so far as
the organization and functioning of the national government is concerned, Congress may act to maintain the purity of these and other
related federal elections 28 by declaring prepayment of a poll tax to
be unnecessary for voters otherwise eligible to participate in such elections.
On :first view the contentions advanced against the constitutionality
of a federal anti-poll tax law seem to be irrefutable. Beginning with
26
Cf. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 at 664, 4 S. Ct. 152 (1884); Wiley VI.
Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58 at 62, 21 S. Ct. 17 (ICJOO); Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U.S.
487 at 493, 22 S. Ct. 783 (1902); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 at 314-315,
61 S. Ct. 1031.(1941).
27
Article I, § 4: "The times, places and manner of holding elections for senators
and represenatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof; but the
Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the
places of choosing senators.".
28
Cf. Burroughs and Cannon v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 54 S. Ct. 287
(1934), in which the constitutionality of those sections of the Federal Corrupt Practices
Act of 1925 relating to publicity of political committee finances in presidential elections
was upheld. At p. 545 in the opinion Justice Sutherland observed: "To say that Congress is without power to pass appropriate legislation to safeguard such an election from
the improper use of money to influence the result is to deny to the nation in a vital
particular the power of self protection. Congress, undoubtedly, possesses that power,
as it possesses e'Oery other power essential to preseroe the departments and institutions of
the general go'Oernment from impairment or destruction, whether threatened by force
or by corruption." (Italics supplied.)
··
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the first elections under the Constitution it has been the practice to admit to membership in the national electorate those, and only those, who
under the constitutional provisions and laws of the several states are
made eligible to vote for the most-numerous branch of the state legislature. That this is in accord with the int_ent and understanding of the
framers is made clear by examination of the debates in the Federal
Convention and in the ratifying conventions, and of the F ederalistJ
essays.29 At no time has Congress ever passed legislation seeking to impose directly upon the states its own definition of suffrage standards,
although bills of this character have been introduced in Congress prior
to the present controversy.30 Such national regulation of suffrage stand29
See the analysis of views of the framers in Hogensen, "Anti-Poll Tax Legislation and the Constitution," II GEo. WASH. L. REv. 73 (1942). Writing on this
point in No. LII of THE FEDERALIST Madison observed: "The definition of the right
of suffrage, is very justly regarded as a fundamental article of republican government.
It was incumbent on the convention, therefore, to define and establish this right in the
constitution. To,have left it open for the occasional regulation of congress, would have
been improper for the reason just mentioned. To have submitted it to the legislative)
discretion of the states, would have been improper for the same reason; and for the
additional reason, that it would have rendered too dependent on the state governments,
that branch of the federal government, which ought to be dependent on the people
alone. To have reduced the different qualifications in the different states to one uniform rule, would probably have been as dissatisfactory to some of the states, as it wouldi
have been difficult to the convention. The provision made by the convention appears,
therefore, to be the best that lay within their option. It must be satisfactory to every
state; because it is conformable to the standard already established, or which may be
established by the state itself. It will be safe to the United States; because, being fixed
by the state constitutions, it is not alterable by the state governments, and it cannot be
feared that the people of the states will alter this part of their constitutions, in such a
manner as to abridge the rights secured to them by the federal constitution."
In considering the possibility that the Congress, under its power to regulate Con..
gressional elections, might attempt to restrict membership in the House of Representatives to "the wealthy and well-born," Hamilton wrote in No. LX of THE FEDERALfST!
"The truth is, that there is no method of securing to the rich the preference apprehended, but by prescribing qualifications of property either for those who may elect,
or be elected. But this forms no part of the power to be conferred upon the national
government. Its authority would be expressly restricted to the regulation of the times,
the plxes, and the manner of elections. The qualifications of the persons who may
choose or be chosen, as has been remarked upon another occasion, are defined and
fixed in the constitution; and are unalterable by the legislature."
80
In the opinion by Chief Justice Waite in Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall.
{88 U.S.) 162 {1875), in which the Court held that denial of the suffrage to women
by a state did not contravene the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, there was a hint that Congress might possess such power. At p. I 7 I in the
opinion the Court declared: "It is not necessary to inquire whether this power of supervision [ over Congressional elections] thus given to Congress is sufficient to authorize
any interference with the State laws prescribing the qualifications of voters, for no such
interference has ever been attempted. The power of the State in this particular is certain1y supreme until Congress acts." {Italics supplied.)
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1l.rds as has been achieved has been accomplished through constitutional
amendments. Th~y have been phrased in su<;h manner as to leave basic
authority over the subject in the hands of the states, subject to the
specific restrictions enumerated. The Supreme Court has so stated.8 1.
Tax-paying requirements of one kind or another were in force in
many of the states at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and
were not then deemed to have'been disturbed by it. Such suffrage restrictions had almost entirely disappeared by I 860, but they were never
entirely eliminated. The poll tax requirements now in force, although
established after the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment for the
more or less openly avowed purpose of evading the spirit of that
Amen~ent,32 have successfully_withstood every attack in the federal
courts when challenged as violative of restrictions placed on the states
by the United States Constitution. 38 Precedent and practice seem to indicate that conditioning the privilege of voting upon payment of a poll
tax is wholly a matter of state concern, and that no federal constitutional "right" derived from the'Fourteenth, Fifteenth or Nineteenth
Amendments is violated by such a requirement, even where the choice
of national; officers is involved.
Despite these considerations there is some reason to believe that
, the Supreme Court, if presented with an opportunity to _rule directly
upon the question, would find Congress with power to act in the premises. The Supreme Court of 1937 to date has established itself as a precedent-breaking body. It has probably shattered more established conWhether they were inspired by this language in the Court's opinion is not clear;
but in any event bills were introduced in Congress from time to time in the l 88o's
and 1890's proposing to remove the disability placed upon women in regard to participation in House elec;tions. See, for example, S. 3961 and S. 3962, introduced by
Senator Manderson of Nebraska in 1889. 20 CoNG. REc. 1816 '(1889). None of the
bills appears to have reached the floor in either house.
,
3 1. Guinn and Beal
United States, 238 U.S. 347 at 362, 35 S. Ct. 926 (1915);
Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 58 S. Ct. 205 (1937). In the latter case Justice
Butler, speaking for a unanimous Court, declared at 28 3: "Privilege of voting is not
derived from the United States, but is conferred by the State and save as restrained
by the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments and other provisions of the Federal
Constitution, the State may condition s~ffrage as it deems appropriate."
82 For an account of the state-by-state revival of tax-paying requirements in the
South in the period from 1870 to 1910 see S. Hearings on S. 1280 {the Pepper Bill)
before a sub-committee of the· Senate Judiciary Committee, 77th Cong., 2d sess.,
pp. 253-254. At pp. 261-265 in the same document is a digest of poll tax provisions
in force in the eight 'Southern states having such voting requirements in l 940. Desire
to disfranchise "poor whites," who had displayed irr some sections of the South a predilection for Populism and other "radical" political faiths during the 1890's was also
a factor in the re-establishment of tax-paying requirements.
83
Supra.

v.
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stitutional constructions and interpretations than any other Court in our
history over a similar period of time.34 Significantly, two of its recent
rulings which have upset or greatly modified earlier precedents have
moved in the direction of extending the scope of the guarantees of the
federal Constitution and of Congressional power under it in the sphere
of elections.3 5 A finding by the Court that a federal anti-poll tax statute
lies within the range of Congressional power would fit easily into this
pattern of recent judicial decisions of a nationalizing character.
Again, it sh_ould be observed that the Supreme Court has on occasion shown a willingness to characterize as "political questions" certain
kinds of issues raised before it. The power to dispose of such questions,
it asserts, belongs to the political branches of the national government.
Among the matters it has thus accorded the President and Congress a
determinative authority over are the interpretation and enforcement of
the federal constitutional guarantee of a republican form of government
in the states,3 6 and the definition of the political status of Indian tribes. 37
If these two matters are susceptible of final determination by the political branches of the national government, so also might be a citizen's
claim to a right to participate in national elections. Thus the "political
question" doctrine ,is available to the Court as a basis upon which to
sustain a federal anti-poll tax statute of the sort now under consideration. The contentions advanced in support of the constitutionality of
34
In Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 at 665, note 10, 64 S. Ct. 757 (1944),
the majority opinion cites no less than fourteen cases decided by it since 1937 in which
prior ruling~ were overturned.
35
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 61 S. Ct. 1031 (1941), in which
federal power was held to extend to regulation of Congressional primaries, thus clarifying a point obscured since the decision in Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232,
41 S. Ct. 469 (1921); and Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. -649, 64 S. Ct. 757 (1921),
overruling Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 55 S. Ct. 622 (1935), wherein the
Southern "white primary'' system, when not based directly on state legislative authorization, had been held not to violate the Fifteenth Amendment.
36
Cf. Luther v. Borden, 7 How. (48 U.S.) 1 at 42 (1849); Taylor and Marshall v. Beckham (No. 1), 178 U.S. 548 at 578, 20 S. Ct. 890, 1009 (1899); Pacific
States Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. II8 at 150, 32 S. Ct. 224
(1912); Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrandt, 241 U.S. 565 at 569, 36 S. Ct. 708
(1916); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 at 234, 37 S. Ct. 260
(1917); Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park District, 281 U.S. 74 at 79,
50 S. Ct. 228 (1930).
37
Cf. The Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. (30 U.S.) l at 20 (1831);
United Statb v. Holliday, 3 Wall. (70 U.S.) 407 at 419 (1866); The Kansas Indians,
5 Wall. (72 U.S.) 737 at 756 (i866); United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 at 46,
34 S. Ct. l (1913). On the general subject see PoST, CHARLES G., THE SUPREME
CouRT AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS (1936) and Field, "The Doctrine of Political
Questi?ns in the Federal Courts," 8 MINN. L. REV. 485 (1924).
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such a statute may accordingly have a validity heretofore generally
unrecognized.
The first contention noted above, viz., that Congress is competent
to make a finding that the poll tax requirement is not a bona fide suffrage "qualification" in the constitutional sense is basic to this approach.
This view of the nature of the requirement as it is currently applied can
be defended on a number of grounds. State poll tax regulations have
the effect of discriminating between those who have paid the tax
and those who, although assessed for it, have not paid 'it. It is accordingly a suffrage requirement different from earlier tax-paying qualifications which were essentially indices of property ownership and wealth,
and therefore presumably of political judgment and responsibility.
Individuals upon whom the poll tax is assessed in the seven Southern
states include the greater part of the potential electorate. The payment
of this tax does not in itself serve to set off the payer, in terms of electoral competence, in any significant way from other individuals. The
relation between payment of the poll tax and the likelihood of the
individual's having an economic status indicative of a minimum amount
of political capacity is ,at most casual. Particularly is this so where the
payment of the poll tax of another to make possible the control of his
vote occurs on a wide-spread scale, as appears to be the case in some
sections of the South.38
The theory that payment of a poll tax is an evidence of political
interest and responsibility and is therefore a valid suffrage qualification
loses force also in the face of the obvious fact that in these days of complicated state and local tax structures, which embrace numerous "hidden" tax levies on income and expenditure, every self-supporting in,dividual is a taxpayer in the economic sense, if not by -:legal definition.
To single out the payers of one particular tax as the chosen group who
shall be permitted to exercise the franchise, if they are otherwise eligible, is wholly unrealistic from the point of view of a design to limit the
suffrage to "taxpayers." 39
On still another count there is ground to believe that the Supreme
.
38

'

.
For evidence of the extent to which buying of votes through payment of poll
taxes is practiced in certain localities see Hearings on S. 1280, Sub-committee of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, 77th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 173-177, 277-281.
39
Mississippi requires that a voter, in order to be eligible to participate in general
elections, must have paid all taxes assessed over the two preceding years, including poll
taxes. In primaries, which are the significant elections in that state, however, payment
of only poll taxes is required. Miss. Const.. ( 1890), .art. 12, § 241 ; 3 Miss. Code Ann.
(1942) §§ 3130, 3160, 3235. Until 1935 South Carolina also required that all taxes
assessed be paid in order to vote in state or county elections.
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Court might accord weight to a Congressional finding that the requirement that a poll tax must have been paid is not a genuine suffrage
"qualification" in the constitutional sense. All states employing this
device grant exemption from it to various groups in the electorate.
South Carolina, Mississippi and Texas exempt all persons over sixty;
Tennessee exempts those over fifty; and Alabama those over fortyfive.40 As has already been pointed out, persons in the armed services
of the United States have been exempted in all the seven states which
retain the poll tax system. Among other groups exempted in one or
more states are the deaf, dumb, blind, insane, those disabled by loss of
a hand or foot, ex-Confederate veterans, pensioned veterans of military
service and their widows, and members of the State Guard. 41 Despite
the fact that the Supreme Court has specifically refused to hold that
exemptions of this nature render the poll tax requirement inoperative
because of conflict with the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment,42 it is evident that there is a certain element of spuriousness about a suffrage "qualification" with so many loopholes in it.
The Supreme Court might also conceivably find persuasive the
contention that, without regard to its own views on whether the payment of a poll tax may constitutionally be required by a state as a condition for voting, it should respect a Congressional declaration that such a
requirement shall not be enforced on those seeking to vote in ~ national election because it obstructs the exercise of a constitutionally
guaranteed right of popular participation in such elections. The possibility that the Court might support a federal anti-poll tax law on this
ground is suggested by the language of (then) Justice Stone's opinion
in the Classic case:
''While, in a loose sense, the right to vote for representatives
in Congress is sometimes spoken of as a right derived from the
states, see Minor v. Happersett, 2I Wall. r62, r70; United States
v. Reese, 92 U.S. 2r4, 2r7-2r8; McPherson v. Blacker, r46 U.S.
r, 38-39; Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 283, this statement
is true only in the sense that the states are authorized by the Cqnstitution, to legislate on the subject as provided by Sec. 2 of Art.
I, to the extent that Congress has not restricted state action by the
exercise of its powers to regulate elections under § 4 and its more
generf!,l power under Article I,§ 8, clause r8 of the Constitution
40
Hearings on S. 1280, Sub-committee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 77th
Cong., 2d sess., pp. 261-265.
41
Ibid.
42
Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 58 S. Ct. 205 (1937).
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'to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers.'" 48
The meaning to be attached to this statement is not altogether clear.
The issue before the Court was the power of Congress to enforce the
right of a qualified voter to have his vote received and counted honestly
in a Con~essional primary in Louisiana and the construction of federal
statutes i~ this regard. So far as the controversy over Congressional
power to amend state suffrage qualifications in concernea, this part
of the Court's opinion is dictum. That the learned justice had in mind
only the right of a qualified voter to vote and the power of Congress
to protect his right to do so is suggested by language at other points
in the opinion.44 If that was the meaning intended, the statement goes
no farther than previous judicial pronouncements ~5 wherein Congress
was held to have power to protect ·the right of voters, eligible unq.er
state suffrage requirements, to have their ballots received and counted.
On its face, however, this statement appears to mean that the power
of the state to make provisions on the election of members of Congress,
including provisions on who shall be allowed to participate in such
elections, is ;,ubject to a superior power in Congress. The implication
is that the constitutional right of the "people" to choose is not only enforceable, but also in some degree definable, by Congress. However
revolutionary such a conception of federal legisl1tive power may appear to be, it is not an unreasonable one in view of the broad powers
hitherto conceded Congress to implement those provisions of the Constitution dealing with the structure and functioning of the national government.
So far as the Suffrage Amendments alone are concerned, a state
might impose on prospective voters such conditions as residence in the
state for fifteen years, an age requirement of forty years, ownership of
property worth $ ro,ooo, or an educational attainment equivalent to a
48
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 at 315, 61 S. Ct. 1031 (1941). (Italics
supplied.)
44
•
Id. at 31 o: "Such right as is secured by the Constitution to qualified voters
to choose members of the House of Representatives is thus to be exercised in conformity
to the requirements of state law subject to the restrictions prescribed by § 2 and to the
authority conferred on Congress by § 4, to regulate the times, places and manner of
holding elections for representatives." (Italics supplied.)
And at p. 3 1 5: "Obviously included within' the right to choose, secured by the
Constitution, is the right of qualified voters within a state to cast their ballots and have
them counted at Congressional elections." (Italics supplied.)
45 Ex parte Yarbrough, IIO U.S. 651, 4 S. Ct. 152 (1884); Wiley v. Sinkler, 179
U.S. 58, 21 S. Ct. 17 (1900); United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 35 S. Ct.
904 (1915).
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college degree. It would be difficult to contend that "qualifications"
such. as these are consistent with the spirit and intent of the Constitution, even though they do not contravene directly the Fourteenth,
Fifteenth or Nineteenth Amendments. But if they are void under the
Constitution, on what grounds could they properly be held invalid
except on the basis of conflict with a federal statute protecting the right
of the people to choose their national legislative officers? The agency
which in the past has assumed tesponsibility for passing judgment on
whether the states have transcended constitutional limits in prescribing
suffrage requirements has been the Supreme Court. It has been compelled to rely solely upon the provisions of the Suffrage Amendments
as weapons with which to strike down state measures deemed violative
of the principles of popular government. 46 Why should it not also take
into account the formally expressed views of Congress in such cases,
particularly when the state measures in question concern elections of
members of Congress, a matter on which the Constitution specifically
grants to Congress a power to override state regulations?
Recognition of this principle by the Court would not have the
effect of transferring to Congress complete authority to prescribe
suffrage qualifications for voters in national elections. It would only
concede to Congress power to nullify state electoral restrictions which
run counter to the constitutional stipulation that the choice of federal
legislative officers must be made by the people.47 The authority of the
state to impose on voters in state and local elections a poll tax or other
type of requirement not clearly prohibited by the Suffrage Amendments would be unaffected. 411 •
0

46

Cf. Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880); Guinn and Beal v. United States,
238 U.S. 347, 35 S. Ct. 926 (1915); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 47 S. Ct.
466 (1927); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 52 S. Ct. 484 (1932); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 64 S. Ct. 757 (1944).
47 Since the Constitution states explicitly in Article II, § 1, that presidential electors must be appointed in each state "in such manner as ~e legislature. thereof may
direct," the contention that Congress may abolish the poll tax requirement in presidential elections in order to protect an implied constitutional right of popular participation is not applicable. Nevertheless the Pepper-Marcantonio Bill purports to cover
presidential as well as congressional elections. It will be noted that the poll tax exemption clause in the Servicemen's Ballot Act of 1944 covers all national elections, including presidential elections. Supra, note 13. It should be observed that the power of
Congress to regulate campaign funds in presidential elections has been sustained by the
Supreme Court. Supra, note 28.
48 Restrictions of the applicability of the poll tax exemption principle to federal
elections in the Pepper-Marcantonio Bill in one sense deprives advocates of one of their
strongest constitutional supports, although it gives their proposal, no doubt, wider political appeal by offering less challenge to the doctrine of states rights. If the proposed
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For the reasons outlined above there is, therefore, considerable
justification for the belief that past practice and understandings would
not necessarily be determinative of the outcome, should opportunity
be afforded for a judicial test of the authority of Congress to abolish
by law the poll tax requirement in federal elections. The principle at
stake is a far broader one than mere annulment of the poll tax requirement. If a statute of this nature should be passed and the Supreme
Court should make a favorable finding on its constitutionality, a foundation will have been established upon which Congress might proceed
in the future to impose necessary restraints on any 'state qent upon
disfranchising politically weak minority elements through imposition
of spurious suffrage "qualifications."
A federal constitutional amendment declaring the imposition of a
poll tax requirement in national elections to be invalid might well fall
short of achieving its fundamental purpose. States opposed to the principle of a tax-free franchise could easily discover new ways of disfranchising "poor whites" and Negroes, not violative of the letter of
such an amendment, just as they have discovered means of circumventing the Fifteenth Amendment through the poll tax requirement
and, until it was recently invalidated, the "white primary" system.
Implicit in the Fourteenth, Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments is a
national policy of guaranteeing the suffrage to all competent adult citizens. If this policy is te be effectively safeguarded, at least in national
elections, against the acts of a minority of states which refuse to subscribe- to it, the approach proposed in the current anti-poll tax measure
offers far more promise of success in the end than resort to the cumbersome process of constitutional amendment.
statute contemplated abolition of the poll tax requirement in state and local elections,
the point could be made that it is designed to carry out the federal constitutional
guarantee of a republican form of government in the states. As has been pointed out
above, the Supreme Court has consistently maintained that primary responsibility rests
upon the President and Congress to give meaning and effect to this guarantee. Since
the poll tax results in the exclusion of a substantial portion of the adult citizenry from
the electorate, it could well be argued that it is violative of this guarantee and that
Congress might therefore abolish it for state elections. This would have the effect of
eliminating the requirement also for ·national elections. Note Madison's comment on
the relationship between suffrage requirements and the republican character of a state's
government in the excerpt quoted supra, note 29.
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